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A.: Sales--Bulk Sales Act--Lessor Not Creditor As To Future Rent
CASE COMMENTS
If the mining clause by the use of the words "said coal" does
not refer to and mean all the coal, why then was a mining clause
inserted in the deed? Indeed, the effect of the construction placed
on the mining clause in the principal case renders it useless and
redundant, mere surplusage. A grant merely of "the coal" in a
severance deed containing no mining clause whatsoever would
give the grantee, as an incident to the ownership of the coal, "the
right to use the surface in such manner and with such means as
would be fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate",
Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 807, 121 S.E. 90 (1924), in other
words, all the rights and privileges to mine and remove the coal that
the grantees were said to have received in the principal case. Thus,
the court now holds that the same legal effect is to be given to, the
same expression of intention manifests itself from, each of the following grants: (1) A grants to B the coal under Blackacre, and (2)
A grants to B all the coal under Blackacre together with the right
to enter upon and under the land to mine and remove said coal.
But, if A grants to B all the coal under Blackacre together with the
right to enter upon and under the land to mine and remove all the
coal, there is evidenced an intention to waive the right of subjacent
support.
The principal case, therefore, even if it is not a departure from
the rule laid down in the Griffin case, indicates convincingly that
the court intends to limit this rule to the particular facts of that
case. Rightly or wrongly, the court, in this instance, leaves no
room for the application of accepted rules regarding the construction and meaning of written instruments. In its place, in this
instance, it will now apply a rigid and artificial rule of thumb, to
wit: Only the word "all" or its exact equivalent when used in
the mining clause of a severance deed evinces the intention necessary to indicate a waiver of the right of subjacent support.
W. E. C.

SALES-BULK SALES AcT-LEssOR NOT CREDITOR AS TO FUTURE

F, who operated a hardware store
thereon, for two years. The lease provided for a fixed gross rental
payable in monthly installments. Five months after the lease was
executed F sold his entire stock to D. F, having paid his current
monthly rent, and neither F nor D considering P as a creditor, they
failed to include P in the list of F's creditors given notice in the
RENT.-P leased premises to
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manner required by the bulk sales act, ILL. REv. STAT. c. 121 1/2,
§ 78 (1949). P contended that the sale was in violation of the act
and that he could resort to the proceeds in the hands of the garnishee-defendant for all rents to become due under the lease after
the date of the sale. The Municipal Court of Chicago gave judgment for D. Held, on appeal, that the lessor under a lease providing for fixed gross rental payable in monthly installments is not a
"creditor" within the meaning of the bulk sales act as to installments of rent not yet due at the time of the sale. Judgment affirmed. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Fargeson,92 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. 1950).
West Virginia, Illinois and a majority of the other states have
similar bulk sales acts following the New York form. There are
no cases in point in West Virginia.
According to the principal case, the original impetus for the
enactment of the bulk sales acts came from merchandise creditors.
In Lewis-Hubbard & Co. v. Laughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 240, 101 S.E.
465, 467 (1919), the court said that the purpose of the legislature in
passing the act was to preserve the merchandise itself as security
for those engaged in the wholesale merchandise business unless it
was sold in the-ordinary course of business. However, the general
tendency of the courts has been to liberalize the meaning of the
word "creditor" and extend protection to creditors of the seller at
the time of the sale other than merchandise creditors. Huckins v.
Smith, 29 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1928); Winthrop Restaurant Co. v.
Kournetas, 265 Ill. App. 535 (1932). One of the most liberal interpretations of the word "creditor" as used in these acts is found in
United States v. Goldblatt Bros, 128 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1942), which
was an action against the vendee for the vendor's federal income
taxes covering the year in which the sale was made. The United
States government was held to be a creditor, the court saying, "It is
significant that the statute contains only the word 'owing'. That
word was not used in the limited sense of a liability that has become
due and payable; it was to cover a liability in contra-distinction to
a contingent claim which depended upon the occurrence of another
event before liability was established." Id. at 580. Even a case
going this far does not seem inconsistent with the decision in the
principal case, for the federal court recognized that a contingent
claim for damages for breach of a contract is not covered by the
bulk sales act, but that the tax items involved were debts and were
within the act notwithstanding they were not payable until after
the date of the sale.
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In Lawndale S. & D. Co. v. West Side T. & S. Bank, 207 Ill.
App. 3 (1917), it was held that the lessor of premises to a corporation is not a "creditor" of the corporation at the time of the sale
of its business to another when there is no rent due under the
lease. It seems that any debt for which the lessee may become
obligated in a liquidated amount to the lessor would arise from the
use of the premises by the lessee, and until such use no liquidated
debt exists. Such liquidated debt is contingent on the lessee's occupation of the premises in the future. The only other alternative
remedy accrues upon a lessee's failure to use the premises and repudiation of the lease, in which event the lessor may bring an action
for damages. Although there is a split of authority on the subject,
the better view seems to be that the lessor should make a reasonable
effort to re-let so as to mitigate damages, allowing him to recover
any deficiency between that for which he re-lets and the amount of
the rent under the lease. Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa
140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945); Zabriskie v. Sullivan, 82 N.J.L. 545, 81
At. 1135 (1911). Such amount certainly is contingent and unliquidated. A leading case in point is Apex Leasing Co. v. Litke,
159 N.Y. Supp. 21, 121 N.E. 853 (1916), in which the facts were
substantially the same as those in the principal case. The rent
for the month in which the sale was made was satisfied by the
lessee's deposit, and the court held that as the rental payments became due the lessor would have a cause of action but that at the
time of the sale it was only a contingent liability under the lease
and was not protected by the bulk sales act. Apparently the only
case in point contra to the principal case is Wright v. Haley, 208
Ind. 46, 194 N.E. 637 (1935), which held that the lessor was a
creditor within the meaning of the act, the lessee being obligated
to pay the rent for the full term since no surrender of the lease
was shown. The court said that obligations to make payments for
merchandise delivered and accepted or to pay a promissory note
given for money were no different than the obligation of the lessee
to pay rent for the full term. The court's argument here is convincingly met by the principal case which points out that the vital
difference lies in the fact that a merchandise creditor parts with his
goods and a money creditor with his money, but that a lessor in no
comparable sense parts with his property, he being given preferential and speedy remedies to repossess and obtain payment of rent.
In Talty v. Schoenholz, 224 Ill. App. 158 (1922), the court
held that the purpose of the bulk sales act was to prevent sales of
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stocks of goods in bulk without first giving the creditors of the
vendor an opportunity to protect themselves. What opportunity
or advantage could the lessor have by receiving notice of the sale
in advance? The lessee had not broken his lease; his rent was paid
in full. On what grounds could the lessor base his complaint in
taking any action prior to the sale? There is nothing to show that
the rights of the lessor have been prejudiced.
W. W. A.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF WIFE TO RECOVER FOR Loss OF
CONSORTIUm DUE TO INJURY CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE.-An employee

of defendant company was injured as a result of its negligence
while in its employ. The employee's loss was covered by a compensation act, but his wife sued the company to recover for the
loss of consortium as a result of the negligent injuries. Held, on
appeal, that a wife has a cause of action for the loss of consortium
due to a negligent injury of her husband, that consortium includes
not only material services but also love, affection, companionship
and sexual relations, and that her recovery is not barred by his
receiving benefits under the compensation act. Judgment reversed.
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
This decision is particularly worthy of note because it is only
the second case holding that the wife was able to recover for loss
of consortium due to a negligent injury of her spouse. The first
case to so hold, Hipp v. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9,
108 S.E. 318 (1921), was later overruled. Hinnant v. Tide Water
Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). Although at least
one commentator points out that the path is clear for such a recovery by the wife, so far as has been found, the principal case is
the only standing decision to permit such action. HARPER, TORTS
566 (1933).
The weight of authority is overwhelmingly against allowing
the wife to recover anything for the loss of consortium as a result
of the negligent injury of her husband. Emerson v. Taylor, 133
Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918); Cravens v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195
Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Howard v. Verdigris Val. Elec. Co-op.,
207 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1949). There is a generally recognized exception to this denial to the wife. When the injury is intentional,
such as criminal conversation, adultery or seduction, she has a right
of recovery against the offending party. Eschenbach v. Benjamine,
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